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Abstract
We clarify and reinterpret the results of Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) concerning the effect
of a uniform price restriction on the proceeds of an IPO. If regular institutional investors are,
on average, at least as well informed as ordinary retail investors then our corrected version of
Benveniste and Wilhelm’s model shows that a uniform price restriction does not affect IPO
proceeds.
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Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) (hereafter B&W) address the problem of an Ini-
tial Public Oﬀer where the issuer uses the bookbuilding method to elicit infor-
mation from potentially informed investors. Their contribution is of importance
in the debate over whether regulatory constraints on the ability of underwriters
to price discriminate may aﬀect the proceeds attainable from the issue. B&W
contend that a uniform price restriction may increase the cost of soliciting in-
formation from regular investors, thus reducing the proceeds available to the
issuer. However, the model of B&W would appear to contain several inconsis-
tencies. In this Comment, we attempt to clarify their results and reinterpret
their conclusions. Our corrections impact dramatically upon the statements of
their central Theorem 1 and Proposition 1. Speciﬁcally, using B&W’s assump-
tions, we obtain a very diﬀerent result for the magnitude of underpricing oﬀered
to retail investors. In turn, this alters the circumstances under which the issuer
will ﬁnd it optimal to oﬀer shares to retail investors. Only when regular insti-
tutional investors are, on average, less well informed than retail investors may
the uniform pricing constraint bind. Otherwise, a uniform price restriction does
not aﬀect IPO proceeds.
2M o d e l s e t - u p
B&W’s analysis “... is carried out in the context of a model in which both
regular and retail investors may possess information that the underwriter does
not. Within this environment, the underwriter conditions the oﬀer price and
allocation on information gathered in the premarket and fully allocates the issue
to regular or retail investors before the aftermarket price conveys the added
information”.
The State of the Environment can be g, b (good/bad information exists) or u
(no information exists), with probabilities π
2, π
2 and 1−π respectively. In the ﬁrst
stage of the marketing eﬀort, “... the underwriter attempts to learn investors’
information by soliciting indications of interest from regular investors.” We refer
the reader to the original article for fuller details of the model.
Regular Investors Conditioned on information existing, the probability that
any particular regular investor has this information is πi and each regular in-
vestor is independent of the others.
B&W state that “...conditioned on being uninformed, a regular investor faces




[P´( g,0) + P´( b,0)] + (1 − π) (1)
(B&W, equation 4, page 180)
This expression would appear to be incorrect.
1The probabilities π
2, π
2 and 1−π are ex-ante unconditional probabilities for
the possible states of the world, g, b and u. However, when a regular ﬁnds
himself to be uninformed, he should update these probabilities using Bayes’
Rule to take account of his (absence of) information.
The conditional probabilities are:
Pr(state g |uninformed)=
π
2 (1 − πi)
(1 − π)+π (1 − πi)
=
π












The correct expression for this conditional probability is therefore:
P´( u,0) =
π
2 (1 − πi)[P´( g,0) + P´( b,0)] + (1 − π)
1 − ππi
(5)
B&W correctly note that (page 180) “...the unconditional and conditional prob-














H = P(b,0) =
π
2
(1 − πi)P´ (b,0) (7)
thus we can rewrite equation (5) explicitly as
P´ (u,0) =
π(1 − πi)
H +( 1− π)
1 − ππi
(8)
Retail Investors B&W Theorem 1 derives the expected underpricing re-
quired by uninformed retail investors when all H regulars have indicated ‘unin-
formed’. In their proof (Appendix 1), B&W appear to weight the state depen-
dant payoﬀsw i t ht h eunconditional probabilities of each state. However, since
the expected underpricing in Theorem 1 arises only in situations when all H
regulars have said ‘uninformed’, it should be the conditional probabilities (of
true states g, b and u,g i v e nt h a tH regulars have said ‘uninformed’) that are
used to reﬂect this information.
Theorem 1 would therefore appear to be incorrect.
Noting
P(g,0) = P(b,0) =
π
2






P(u,0) = 1 − π (10)
2then the conditional probabilities are
Pr(state g|H are uninformed)=
π
2 (1 − πi)
H
π (1 − πi)
H +1− π
(11)
Pr(state b|H are uninformed)=
π
2 (1 − πi)
H




Pr(state u|H are uninformed)=
1 − π
π (1 − πi)
H +1− π
(13)




2 (1 − πi)
H [sg − (su − ε)]βuQr
+(1− π)[su − (su − ε)]βuQr
+π
2 (1 − πi)
H £






sg − su = su − sb = α (15)








This expression should replace B&W’s equation (5), page 181. B&W’s equation
(6) is aﬀected accordingly and we oﬀer a corrected version in the appendix.
We see that as H increases, so ε decreases corresponding to the intuition
that the larger the pool of regular investors, the more reliable is a unanimous
‘No Information’ declaration and so the smaller is the Rock Discount required
to protect uninformed retail investors. We note that B&W’s ε is independent
of H and πi and so does not possess this intuitive property.
A similar error of principle seems to be contained in equations (9) and (10)
(page 183) and we oﬀer corrected versions in the appendix. B&W appear to
correctly update when information is g, yet they fail to update correctly when
information is u.
The error in the expression for ε in Theorem 1 is carried through to the
derivation of Proposition 1 which states the condition for implementing Strat-
egy 1 (allocating the entire issue to regular investors when all H have said
‘uninformed’). Substituting our corrected ε into the inequality at the bottom





H (βu +1 )+2 βu(1 − π)
(1 − βu)π(1 − πi)
H (17)
This expression should replace B&W’s equation (15), page 187.
3By substituting in the explicit expressions
P(.,0) = π (1 − πi)





Hπi (1 − πi)
H−1 (19)
we can simplify this to (for derivation see appendix)
π (1 − πi)






+2( 1− π)[(1− βu) − πi] > 0 (20)
which should replace B&W’s equation (17).
Thus we can now derive explicit bounds on the relationships between the
parameters π , πi, βu,a n dH, which determine whether Strategy 1 is optimal
or not. The alternative, Strategy 2, involves allocating the entire issue to retail







[(1 − βu) − πi] > 0 (22)
Hence our equation (21) provides a suﬃcient, but not necessary, condition for
Strategy 1 to be optimal.
Moreover, if




− πi < 0 (24)
Hence our equation (23) provides a suﬃcient, but not necessary, condition for
Strategy 2 to be optimal.
Condition (23) has a very intuitive interpretation: if information exists,
then 1 − βu is the proportion of retail investors who will be informed and πi
is the probability that any particular regular investor will be informed. Thus
as u ﬃcient, but not necessary, condition for Strategy 2 to be optimal is that
Regular Investors are, on average, at least as well-informed as retail investors.








that the values of π and H are decisive in choosing between strategies.
Figure 1 illustrates the possibilities: Above the straight line, Strategy 2 is
optimal. Below the curve, Strategy 1 is optimal. In between the line and the
curve, Strategy 1 is optimal if and only if
π(1 − πi)
H ≤
2(1− π)[1− πi − βu]
[4 − (3 − βu)(2− πi)]
(26)
4Figure 1: Graphs of πi =
2(1−βu)














i.e. when π is ‘small enough’ (small probability of information existing) or when
H is ‘high enough’ (small probability of information remaining undiscovered if
it exists).
3C o n c l u s i o n
B&W’s expression (17) and their subsequent analysis is incorrect: It is not true
that “..Strategy 1 is optimal for both ‘large’ and ‘small’ values of πi” (page 189).
In this Comment we have shown that Strategy 1 is only optimal for suﬃciently
small values of πi.
Condition (23) suggests that Strategy1c a no n l yb eo p t i m a li fR e g u l a rI n -
vestors are, on average, less well-informed than retail investors. Only under this
assumption can the Uniform Pricing constraint bind and can the issuer beneﬁt
from the ability to price discriminate. Otherwise, when Regular Investors are,
on average, at least as well informed as retail investors, in B&W’s set-up we
can now rule out the need for price discrimination. In direct contrast, B&W’s
equation (17) suggests that whatever the relative informedness of the investor
groups, the Uniform Pricing constraint will bind whenever there is a suﬃciently
high number of regulars, H.
Reference
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5Appendix
A Correcting equation 5
π
2 (1 − πi)
H [sg − (su − ε)]βu+(1 − π)[su − (su − ε)]βu+π
2 (1 − πi)
H £





2 (1 − πi)
H [α + ε]βu +( 1− π)εβu + π
2 (1 − πi)




2 (1 − πi)
H + βu
π
2 (1 − πi)
H + βu (1 − π)
´
= απ
2 (1 − πi)















B Correcting equation 6














C C o r r e c t i n ge q u a t i o n s9a n d1 0
B&W state that “...the expected payoﬀ to an uninformed regular, indicating u





h=1 P´( g,h)[sg − suh]quh







2 terms are, presumably, the unconditional probabilities that the
true state is good (bad). However, an uninformed regular should update and
use the conditional probability of each state, namely
Pr(state g|uninformed)=
π









h=1 P´( g,h)[sg − suh]quh
+P´ (u,0)[su − su0]qu0
(31)
where P´ (u,0) is understood to be our corrected expression and the ﬁrst term







P(g,h)[sg − suh]quh (32)
6The same error is made in equation 10.
D Correcting equation 17





H (βu +1 )+2 βu(1 − π)
(1 − βu)π(1 − πi)
H (33)
By substituting in the explicit expressions
P(.,0) =
³
π (1 − πi)







Hπi (1 − πi)
H−1 (35)




H +( 1− π)
´
π
2Hπi (1 − πi)
H−1 >
π(1 − πi)
H (βu +1 )+2 βu(1 − π)










H (βu +1 )+2 βu(1 − π)




π (1 − πi)




π (1 − πi)







H − 3π(1 − πi)
H πi − 2βuπ(1 − πi)
H + βuπ(1 − πi)
H πi
´
+(2− 2πi − 2βu − 2π +2 ππi +2 βuπ) (39)
π(1 − πi)
H ((3 − βu)(2− πi) − 4) + 2(1 − π)(1− πi − βu) > 0 (40)
which should replace B&W’s equation (17).
7